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Interest Group Politics and Judicial Behavior:
Macey's Public Choice
Jack M. Beermann

The economic theory of government has lately gained the
acceptance in legal circles that it has long enjoyed in political
science and economics. The economic theory, also known as "public choice," analyzes and explains government action and private
political activity according to the basic assumption of economics,
that individuals respond to economic incentives in their environments in a self-interested manner. The economic theory is thus
useful descriptively, to explain diverse political phenomena, and
prescriptively, to help formulate reform strategy.
In accord with the assumption of self-interest, public choice
theorists have described political activity, including government
itself, as a market in which officials sell favorable action in return
for votes, money (which may help in reelection bids),
postgovernment employment, other support, or a combination of
these. Members of Congress, for example, sell favorable legislation
to organizations that promise to deliver the most votes or the
most campaign support.' Appointed officials, who are also assumed to be acting primarily out of self-interest, peek to maximize
the budgets for their programs, entrench their position within the
bureaucracy, or advance their postgovernment career opportuni2
ties.
The inducement for private individuals to become involved in
politics is the prospect of a positive return on their investment in

* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. Boston University School of
Law provided financial support for this Article. Thanks to James Boyle, Debra Korman,
Ron Cass, Bill Eskridge, Gfinter Frankenberg, Clay Gillette, Avi Soifer, and Joe Singer for
comments on drafts and other valuable assistance. Barbara Melamed provided invaluable
research assistance. Special thanks to Jon Macey for discussing an earlier draft at length.

1 Concern with reelection, in fact, can help explain many recent changes in the
structure of government and the perquisites enjoyed by, Members of Congress. See M.
FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (2d ed. 1989).
2

See Cass & Gillette, The Governmnmt ContractorDefense: Contractual Allocation of Public

Risk, 77 VA. L. REV. 257, 320-35 (1991) (discussing various public choice explanations for
behavior of administrative officials); see also W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971) (discussed in Cass & Gillette, supra).
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voting, lobbying, or other political activity. The model predicts
that people will become involved in politics only when the expected returns from political activity exceed the costs incurred, including foregone expected returns from other activity such as participation in the market or leisure.Public choice predicts that even if, in the aggregate, "average
people" have significant economic interests at stake in the political
process, the costs of organizing, including free-rider problemsinherent in large, noncoercive, organizations, will ensure that it is
only rarely, if ever, worthwhile for the average person to participate in political activity. Therefore, the political world is likely to
be dominated by small groups composed of large, relatively
wealthy, institutions that, because of their high intensity of interest
and small numbers, are able to overcome collective action problems and organize.4 This raises the most corrosive implication of
public choice theory: because the interests of the groups that find
it worthwhile to engage in political activity are not likely to represent the public interest or the interests of people not able to
participate, the outcomes of the political process are likely to be
skewed away from the general interest and toward the interests of
the groups that happen to be able to organize.
But public choice is not necessarily all darkness and gloom. If
people or groups representing diverse interests have sufficient incentives to participate in the political sphere, the implications of
the economic model are not so unambiguously bad. For one, as in
any well-functioning market, single actors will not have sufficient
wealth to capture all goods for themselves. As the cost of defeating opposing interests increases, parties are pushed toward compromise. Indeed, officials may also encourage compromise as a
way of maximizing payments from diverse interests, especially since
elected officials depend on votes from a great number of people.
While public choice predicts that the results of the political process will continue to be skewed toward the interests of those that
actually participate, the broader the spectrum of interests represented, the closer political outputs will reflect the general will.
The pluralist model of politics, in which all interests are represented in the market for legislation, is not the dominant image

3

See Stigler, Economic Competition and Political Competition, 13 PuB. CHOICE 91 (1972).

4 The reason the average person will not benefit from political activity is that one
individual's actions, whether by voting or letter writing or visiting a Member of Congress'
office, are unlikely to influence the outcome of any political debate.

1991]

MACEY'S PUBIC CHOICE

of the proponents of public choice. Legal theorists have been
convinced that the market for legislation is a failure because collective action problems, and not the preferences of citizens, explain the outcome of many lawmaking transactions. Therefore,
analysts have concentrated on the dark side of public choice and
addressed the implications of interest group capture. Stated broadly, the issue has been how to understand our constitutional
structure in light of the potential for interest group capture. More
narrowly, the question has been how judges should treat statutes if
the enacting legislature did not intend to advance any conception
of public interests but instead aimed to transfer wealth from the
political losers to the political winners.
The early answer to how judges should treat statutes produced
in a system dominated by interest groups seems to have been that
judges should enforce the interest group bargain exactly as written, without any allowance for creative interpretation in line with
the overall purposes of the legislation.' Deviation from the bargain in one direction or another, it was argued, would award a
windfall to one of the interests that the interest could not afford
to purchase in the political arena.
This preference for enforcing interest group deals has been
attacked on two fronts--democracy and efficiency. First, if democracy is understood as connoting broadly the notion that government action should reflect the will of society, and if collective
action problems interfere significantly in many people's ability to
influence political outcomes, then a strong principle of enforcement of legislation as written is not necessarily consistent with
democracy. The efficiency objections to enforcing interest group
deals are less obvious but, if true, potentially equally powerful.
7
Jonathan Macey,6 relying heavily on the work of Mancur Olson,

5 See Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective 18 J.
L. & ECON. 875 (1975).
6 Macey has written several articles applying public choice theory to law. I focus
mainly on his more general articles, that is, his articles that make broad points about
public choice and constitutional or statutory interpretation, rather than on his articles on
specific legal issues. The principal articles I examine are Macey, Transaction Costs and The
Normative Elements of The Public Choice ModeL An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA.
L. REV. 471 (1988) [hereinafter Macey, Transaction Costs and Normative Elements]; Macey,
Promoting Public Regarding Legislation through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Mode
86 CoLUM. L REV. 223 (1986) (hereinafter Macey, Promoting Public Regarding]; Macey,
Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 50 (1987) [hereinafter
Macey, Competing Economic Views]; and Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the
Theory of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 43 (1988). To a lesser extent, I also
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has argued that interest group activity is inefficient for two related
reasons. First, legislation consists of government ordered wealth
transfers. Since wealth transfers through government action are
coercive, they are much less likely to be efficient than private,
voluntary transactions which would occur in the market absent
government regulation.8 Second, wealth transfers through government action are just that, naked transfers with no increase in
overall wealth. These transfers might result in a net social loss
because the resources spent procuring wealth through politics
might have been employed productively in the private market in
transactions that would increase social wealth. This is a problem of
opportunity costs: by spending resources in the political sphere,
interest groups give up the opportunity to make productive investments.
Macey attempts, through an economically based constitutional
theory, to confront the inefficiencies that public choice theory reveals. Macey's economic constitutional theory proceeds from two
basic premises: First, that the role of the Constitution is to establish the ground rules of the market for law, and second, that, as
noted above, the availability of wealth transfers through government action is destructive and should therefore be limited through
constitutional rules. In a nutshell, Macey believes that the Constitution was designed to raise the cost to interest groups of favorable legislation so that resources will not be wasted on purchasing
wealth transfers through politics.
Macey envisions a positive role for the independent judiciary
in the minimization of interest group activity in government. He
disagrees with public choice theorists who have argued that judges
should passively enforce the terms of the interest group bargains
made in other branches of government. Instead, Macey proposes

examine Macey, The Missing Element in the Republican Reviva4 97 YALE LJ. 1673 (1988)
[hereinafter Macey, The Missing Element]; Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the
Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMoRY LJ. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Macey,
Glass-Steagali; Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265 (1990) [hereinafter Macey, Federal Deference]; and Macey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare
Dedsis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63 (1989).
7 Especially M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982) [hereinafter M.
OLSON, RISE AND

DECLINE].

See also, M. OLSON,

THE LOGIC OF COLLECIIE ACTION,

(1971) [hereinafter M. OLSON, LOGIC].
8 See Macey, Transactions Costs and Normative Elements, supra note 6, at 516, where
he states that it is "axiomatic" that private transactions are efficient. He must mean private transactions free from private coercion and third party effects.
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that judges construe statutes in a more traditional manner: judges
should use the public purposes that legislatures often attach to
interest group legislation for public consumption as guidelines for
interpreting the statutes. Macey argues this would be constructive
for two reasons. First, it would destabilize interest group legislation, thus increasing its costs and thereby decreasing its frequency.
Second, it would serve the public interest goals that legislators
attached to the legislation.
Macey's work is important because it attempts to construct a
constitutional theory out of the empirical observations of public
choice and because it suggests methods of combatting the negative
implications of public choice theory. However, I am skeptical of
Macey's project on several fronts. This Article focuses on four specific shortcomings in Macey's analysis, against the background of
the broader question of the economic value of regulation. The
first two are related to Macey's view that reform should be directed at making it more expensive for interest groups to procure
legislation so that they will concentrate their efforts on more productive pursuits. First, Macey makes no effort to relate the magnitude of the effects of his proposals to the point at which it is no
longer worthwhile for interest groups to engage in activity designed to achieve government sponsored wealth transfers. In other
words, we have no idea whether Macey's reforms would result in a
massive shift of resources to production or simply increased spending on lobbying and related activities to overcome the new barriers to such activity. Second, Macey does not address how the removal of interest groups from the political landscape would affect
the behavior of government officials. The economic model indicates that as constraints on the behavior of government officials
are removed, government officials may be freer to use government
power for their own purposes. Macey does not identify the incentives that would lead officials free of interest group pressure to act
in the public, rather than self, interest, or why the self-interest of
public officials would suddenly coincide with the public interest.
The third problem addressed concerns Macey's argument that
the Constitution is a public-regarding document. I argue that
Macey does not succeed in demonstrating that rational economic
actors would have framed a public-regarding constitution or that
the conditions at the time of the making of the Constitution were
conducive to the formation of such a constitution. Finally, the
fourth problem discussed is a missing piece of much public choice
theory-the economic influences on judicial behavior. I propose to
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show that without a more comprehensive theory of judicial behavior, public choice theorists are not true to their own theories
when they propose reforms or interpretive strategies that depend
on judicial action. Public choice theorists may not know what to
make of the independent judiciary's role in the political system.
I.

PUBLIC CHOICE AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF
GOVERNMENT

Public choice theory depends most fundamentally on the
assumption that government officials, parties regulated by government, and all private citizens, when they engage in political activity, are acting out of self-interest and not altruistically. Political
participation, under this assumption of economic rationality, occurs only when the expected gains from such participation exceed
the expected costs. Although most public choice theorists believe
that only a narrow group of people will participate, it is not necessarily the case. In fact, it is possible, under an assumption of economic rationality, that participation in political matters will be
widespread. However, it is also possible that incentives for participation are generally so low (and organizing costs so high) that
only narrow interests will be reflected in political outcomes.
A.

Pluralism and Democracy

The brighter side of public choice, often referred to as "pluralism," portrays the ability of people to band together and press
their interests to government as a strength of an open and democratic system.9 In a large, industrialized country, direct individual
participation is an unrealistic method of democratic control of
government. Further, representatives are few relative to the number of issues that come before government, so voting cannot adequately reflect the preferences of the voters over the large range
of issues. Group pressure, in an open society in which everyone is
free to join groups, is the most practical and effective strategy for
democratic control.

9 See R. FoWLER & J. ORENSTiN, CONTEMPoRARY ISsUES IN POLITICAL THEORY 35-37
(1977). Fowler and Orenstein identify three advantages that proponents ascribe to pluralism. First, pluralists claim that groups provide the only meaningful chance at participation for most people in contemporary society. Second, pluralism is the only practical

form of democracy today. Finally, pluralism provides for change within a generally stable
context-the pressure to compromise will temper any radical desires held by a single
group. See also references collected in M. OLSON, LOGIC, supra note 7, at 111-25.
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Inexpensive means of mass communication make participation
realistic for almost all members of society. In our own political system, we see the average person's interests represented through
organizations such as consumer advocacy groups, although public
choice would argue that only a narrow band of consumer interests
are likely to be represented. Still, casual observation indicates that
there is relatively widespread participation in interest groups representing the interests of great numbers of people.
Because it is so easy to join a group, it may also be easy to
start one. Public choice theorists may view the formation of interest groups as an entrepreneurial activity. 10 Founding, directing,
and working within an interest group presents an economic opportunity. The easier it is for people to join groups, the more likely
that potential entrepreneurs will find it worthwhile to found them
and direct them.
The question remains, why do people join groups? It would
be unrealistic to suppose that everyone who sends in a membership fee expects that group pressure on government will produce
policy change worth the membership fee." This is even more
unrealistic when one realizes that most benefits produced by
groups are public goods, that is, enjoyment of the benefit cannot
be reserved to members of the group. Some groups provide other
incentives to join, such as magazines, calendars, or various other
products. 2 The directors will try to lure contributors by making
membership and additional support look attractive, perhaps by
promising effectiveness or by offering products like newsletters
that make the membership cost worthwhile. But many people
donate money to groups or pay membership dues far in excess of
the value of any tangible products included.
People may join groups because even though the aver-age
person has no rational hope of influencing political decision making by joining, the satisfaction gained from contributing may provide a sufficient incentive. For many people, participation may be
a consumption good rather than a means to a political end. In

10 See M. OLsON, LOGIC, supra note 7, at 175; Wilson, The Politis of Regulation, in
THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 370 (J. Wilson ed. 1980).
11 Real economic incentives may sometimes exist. See infra text following note 11.
12 If people joined groups to receive a product rather than to indicate support for
the group policies, it would not necessarily be democratic for such groups to influence
government action. I do not understand, however, why such groups would survive, because other producers could offer the goods at lower prices since they would not include
a premium to support group political activity.

190
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the course of convincing people of the worthiness of their causes,
the directors of groups may convince people that they have a civic
duty to donate to important causes. People may then contribute
so that they can feel that they are a participating member of society.
I want to distance myself from these public choice explanations for why people join or lead interest groups. While the explanations ring true for business oriented associations, they do not
explain, except in a tautological fashion, the existence of groups
that depend on volunteerism, where members and leaders lose
economically in order to further deeply held beliefs. The assumption of self-interest leads to the tautology that group activity is a
consumption good. This does not explain why people spend the
money or pass up higher paying employment in order to work in
interest groups; it merely recharacterizes the phenomenon.
The influence of money on political outcomes is viewed as
negative if the guiding principle is one person, one vote. However,
if the amount of financial support that a group is able to garner
reflects the degree of societal support for a group's positions, then
group pressure provides a constructive outlet for political activity.
On the other hand, if group resources are not related to societal
support for their positions, for example because wealthier members of society disproportionately support a particular group or
because members are attracted to the group by a product like a
magazine rather than the group's political positions, then money,
insofar as it aids a group's efforts to gain political influence, is a
distorting factor."

13 I am glossing over two related and important problems here. First, I have not
clearly adopted a baseline against which to measure whether the influence of money, or
other factors such as collective action problems, distort the political process. In other
words, I have not attempted to construct an image of the ideal political system in terms
of democracy. This is very difficult in light of the second issue I am glossing over, the
degree to which intensity of preference should affect political outcomes. In the market
for goods and services, intensity of preference, as signified by willingness to pay, has a
significant effect, and it is not normally viewed as a distortion but rather as the beauty
of the market. If everyone votes, and voting is the only political activity engaged in by
nonpublic servants, then the economic and political markets may be different with regard
to the reflection of intensity of preferences with the political market much less likely to
reflect them. In the actual political market, intensity of preferences is important, and
without a definition of democracy it is unclear that this is necessarily a bad thing. See J.
BUCHANAN & G. TULLocK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962). Nonetheless, public choice
argues that collective action problems mean that the ability of interests to have influence
does not necessarily reflect the intensity of preferences of members of society.
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The next issue is why groups, once formed, have influence.
The dynamic of group pressure is not altogether clear. In an idealized view, representatives would measure the will of the people
as expressed through groups and direct public policy in accordance with their best estimate of overall societal sentiment. Understanding this dynamic from a public choice perspective, however,
requires analysis of incentives-what incentives do representatives
(or other government actors) have to act according to, or listen at
all to, the will of people as expressed through groups? The attempt to understand this process, together with analysis of the
formation and maintenance of groups, is at the heart of public
choice.
The most obvious incentive operating on Members of Congress is the desire to be reelected. With House Members this is an
almost constant struggle since they must stand for reelection every
two years. The reelection incentive will lead to responsiveness to
group pressure for two reasons. First, groups that represent large
numbers of voters and can claim credibly to be able to influence
the votes of those members can threaten the reelection prospects
of uncooperative representatives. Second, because candidates need
money to finance reelection campaigns, groups with substantial
assets available for campaign-related contributions can use the
threat of withholding those funds, or directing them to opponents,
to win cooperation. If, and this is a big if, these tools available to
groups reflect the will of the electorate at large, then group pressure is a tool of democracy that should be welcome in a large
society with little chance for effective individual pressure.
The beauty of a well-functioning political system is its consistency with norms of equality. Voting can be an equalizing activity
14
because votes are distributed equally to all members of society.
Voters can combat market inequities through the political system
because the power of the vote takes no account of the wealth of
the voter. However, if not everybody votes, then voters (or likely
voters in the eyes of politicians), are likely to have greater influence than nonvoters. Further, when voting is not the only political
activity, inequality of political influence may occur because some

14 For an economic analysis of voting and the ways in which intensities of preferences show up in the political system, see J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 13. Buchanan and Tullock analyze how different voting rules and different rules regarding the
trading of votes affects the efficiency of political outcomes.
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people will participate in other activity, such as lobbying, more
than others.
The interaction between groups and nonelected officials is
more complicated and deserves special attention. What incentives
exist for appointed officials, for example, officials in administrative
agencies, to listen to groups? It has been suggested that bureaucrats pursue four related goals: they seek to maximize the budgets
of their programs, advance the goals of their programs, service
clients (e.g., interest groups, unorganized constituents), and advance their personal positions.' Because pursuit of these goals
usually requires cooperation from Congress, administrative officials
will find it in their interests to please any interest groups with
influence in Congress, so the interest groups will use their pull in
Congress to help the agencies. 6 This relationship among Congress, agencies, and groups has been referred to as an "Iron Triangle. " 17 Again, if the groups are representative of the desires of
society at large, then this interaction is just a mechanism for ensuring democratic control of the agencies."
Interest group politics, in which all interested groups have
voices, tends to be a politics of compromise, 9 partly to avoid excessive lobbying costs and partly because voters' positions tend
toward the middle.2" Compromise occurs because as the costs to

15 See Cass & Gillette, supra note 2. The first three goals may be means to attain
the fourth goal-a bureaucrat may find that her interests are advanced when the program is successful, has a large budget, and keeps constituencies happy.
16 See G. ADAMS, THE PoLmIcs OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING: THE IRON TRIANGLE 24-26
(1981); Note, Begging to Defer: OSHA and the Problem of Interpretive Authority, 73 MINN. L.
REV. 1336 (1989).
17 See G. ADAMS, supra note 16.
18 Another way in which interest groups may influence regulators is much more
difficult to portray as consistent with democracy. Government officials, including Members
of Congress and appointed officials, may need jobs from regulated parties after their
term in government. They may, therefore, treat potential employers more favorably than
the public at large would want. The ability of officials to get away with this type of behavior depends on whether the behavior is successfully monitored by other interested
parties who can alert other Members of Congress to the problems caused by favoritism.
19 Politicians must balance gains from interest group favoring action against potential
losses in votes from broad, unorganized constituencies. Therefore, they cannot favor interest group desires to the exclusion of other factors. See Peltzman, Toward a More General
Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L & ECON. 211 (1976).
20 Mancur Olson has argued that collective action problems mean no society can
achieve the kind of equilibrium of interest group influence described here. See M.
OLSON, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 7, at implication 1, ch. 3. William Eskridge and
Gary Peller have noted that theorists in the 1950s believed that equilibrium was possible
but that this view was abandoned in the 1960s. The normative justification for interest
group politics then shifted to its tendency to stabilize society and moderate conflict. See
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a group of a potential policy rise, the group will spend more resources fighting the policy. Legislators act as brokers, maximizing
support and minimizing .opposition .among voters, so if powerful
groups are on opposite sides, middle positions may be the best
overall political strategy. Further, the various groups have an incentive to compromise to avoid excessive lobbying costs.
In reality, all of these effects are much more complicated
than this simplistic portrayal. The ways in which interest groups
influence government, and the interactions among different parts
of government are very complicated. Unorganized voters may
sometimes play an important role, since elected officials are obviously answerable to the electorate at large. One point that seems
important but about which it is difficult to get a clear picture
involves the more intangible ways that political support influences
government action. On some issues, votes (enough to influence an
election) or jobs of administrators may not be at stake, yet general
political support appears important. Government officials may
need cooperation from each other and from the public to make a
proposed policy feasible. If the prospects for cooperation are dim,
then even without the raw assertion of power involved in elections
or funding cuts, the voices of groups may influence the governmental process.
It would be nice to know just how much influence narrow
interest groups have in the political system, and whether that
influence is on the rise or decline. I would not have much confidence in any estimation I make here, but there is at least cause
for hope that interest group excesses are subject to some constraint. The constraint is competition among groups. Morris
Fiorina has observed that the proliferation of Congressional subcommittees has spawned jurisdictional fights in which Members of
Congress fight for control over issues that affect their pet
groups.21 This, in turn, has directed more issues to the floor of
Congress, where they receive a more public airing than if they
were resolved at the committee level.22 Competition among inter-

Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movement- Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form,
89 Mtc. L. REV. 707, 738, 741-43 (1991). Buchanan and Tullock argue that equilibrium
is unlikely to occur under any decision making rule other than unanimity because of
differences in the intensities of participants' preferences and the ability to externalize
costs of government action. SeeJ. BUcHANAN & G. TULLOcK, supra note 13, at 287-89.
21 M. FIORINA, supra note 1, at 121-24.
22 For an interesting discussion of the committee system, and whether committees
reflect the will of the general membership of Congress, see Krehbiel, Are Congresional
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est groups might thus provide a check against the ability of narrow interests to prevail.
B. Public Choice and Capture
Most public choice theorists who apply the economic theory
of government to law do not accept the rosy picture of interest
group politics presented above. Rather, public choice theorists take
each of the activities described above-interest group participation,
formation and influence-and argue that economic realities cause
each to occur antidemocratically,
and that regulation produced
23
tends toward inefficiency.
Mancur Olson's landmark work on collective action argues
that economic theory predicts that the average person is unlikely
to engage in political activity and that the political world is likely
to be dominated by relatively narrow interests.24 Assuming that
self-interest motivates people to engage in political activity, public
choice theorists argue that for most people, incentives to engage
in political activity are nonexistent 2because
they are unlikely to
5
activity.
such
from
benefits
enjoy any
The reasons that most people will not gain from their political activity are two-fold. First, most people simply do not have the
resources to have any influence on political outcomes. Interests
with less money will constantly be outvoted by more heavily moneyed interests. While large groups of relatively impecunious individuals might theoretically pool their resources to defeat the
wealthier interests, the costs of organizing will usually outweigh the
potential benefits of the influence sought.2"
The second impediment to organizing affects most groups but
is felt most acutely by interests composed of numerous individuals

Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?, 84 AM. POL Sci. REv. 149 (1990).
23 For a discussion of the relationship between political processes and efficiency, see
J. BucHANA & G. TULLOCK, supra note 13, at 265-81.
24 See M. OLSON, LOGIC, supra note 7. Much of my analysis of incentives to engage
in collective activity is drawn from Olson's work.
25 See Horn & Shepsle, Commentary on 'AdministrativeArrangements and the Political Control of Agencies': Administrative Process and OrganizationalForm as Legislative Responses to Agency
Costs, 75 VA. L. REV. 499, 500 (1989).
26 The one political activity in which everyone is equal is voting-every vote is worth
the same as every other vote. However, because no one voter can have a significant effect on the outcome of an election, and voting costs something, many people have no
incentive to vote. Further, to the extent that factors other than voters' desires influence
government behavior, equal voting rights do not solve the problems of insufficient means
of recourse and costily organization.
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with relatively little at stake. Most public policies are public goods,
that is, once a policy is produced, everyone, not just participants
in the political process, is free to enjoy the benefits of the policy.
For example, all victims of discrimination, not only members of
civil rights lobbying groups, benefit from increased statutory protection against discrimination. In many situations, it is impossible
or impractical to exclude nonparticipants from the benefits of
favorable government action.
The public goods nature of most government action destroys
the incentive for participation because nonparticipants know that
they will enjoy the benefits of group activity without joining the
group. So even if the individual would gain from the reform
sought, the incentive to contribute to the joint effort is not measured by the amount at stake but rather by the amount, if any, of
the benefit that would be enjoyed exclusively by participants. Often, that amount will be zero, and therefore there will be no incentive to participate.
The implications of the impediments to participation discussed above should be obvious. Because of the costs of organizing
and the free-rider problem, voluntary groups will not organize
around policies that affect large numbers of individuals each with
a relatively small stake in the policies. Group membership will not,
therefore, represent democracy in any relevant sense, but will
instead reflect interests that happen to be able to overcome the
impediments to organizing.
Mancur Olson attempts to explain the characteristics of
groups that are able to organize despite public goods problems.
His theories grow directly out of his description of the impediments to group formation and are worth a closer look than I give
them here.2 7 Groups that are able to form and engage in lobbying activity tend to have one of the following characteristics: some
are very small, so that one or more members finds it worthwhile
to engage in the activity regardless of what others do; some are
able to penalize nonmembers such.as through boycotts or barring
nonmembers from holding jobs (mandatory labor unions);28
27 See M. OLSON, LOGIC, supra note 7, at 132-67.
28 Mandatory labor unions have long been controversial in legal and political opinion in the United States. Recently the Supreme Court has placed strict limits on the use
of mandatory union dues for political activity on the ground that involuntary members'
free speech rights were violated. See Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292
(1986); see also Keller v. State Bar of California, 110 S. CL 2228 (1990) (placing first
amendment restrictions on the use of bar dues for political purposes).

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:183

some offer exclusive access to alternative products that make it
worthwhile for people to join because they value the product at
least as much as the dues. The important point here is that the
success with which interests are taken into account in the political
process is unlikely to reflect the general societal distribution of
interests. Many widely held interests are likely to remain unrepresented or at least unsuccessful in the interest group process
because they are unlikely to overcome the impediments to effective organizing.
The inability of broad based interests to organize effectively
and to have much influence on the political scene has important
implications for the nature of the product of the lawmaking process. If groups that are able to organize have influence that transcends the number of votes they have (in crude terms, if dollars
that are unevenly distributed can trump votes that are equally
distributed) then legislation will reflect the narrow interests of the
interest groups. 29 In other words, legislation will be bought by
powerful interests. 0 And the losers in the market for legislation
will be the losers in any market-the people with less money and
power. Legislation, under the public choice model, will redistribute wealth from the relatively poor and powerless to the relatively
wealthy and powerful.'
Elections are not sufficient to combat these problems for a
variety of reasons. Money is very important for a successful campaign, and incumbents find it much easier to raise money from

29 Substantial uncertainty exists regarding the degree of influence interest groups
actually have on the votes of legislators. Some studies have indicated that ideology appears to be the most important determinant of congressional voting. See the discussion
and citations in Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873,

897-901 (1987). On the other hand, it has been argued that interest groups are more
successful at blocking unfavorable legislation than at procuring favorable legislation. See
id. at 887, (citing KL SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERIcAN DEMOCRACY 314-15, 395-96, 398 (1986)).
30 The narrow interests' ability to procure favorable legislation will depend in part

on the strength of opposition. For example, it should be difficult for even a narrow
interest to procure legislation that will hurt another well-organized interest. But in many
situations, the same impediments to organizing around a positive program make it diffi-

cult to organize to prevent unfavorable legislation. For a breakdown of legislation along
these lines, see Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for

Statutoy Interpetaion, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 295-301 (1988).
31 It has been argued that government redistributes wealth from the wealthiest and
poorest to the middle, because politicians find it most advantageous to attract the support of the median voter. See Stigler, Directors Law of Public Income Redistribution, 13 J. L
& EcON. 1 (1970).
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interest groups and constituents than do challengers.3 2 Incumbency itself is a great advantage, because Members of Congress have
voted themselves privileges, like free mailing of literature and
large staffs to help with constituent services. These privileges help
their campaigns because they use their positions in Congress to do
casework, which wins loyal support."3 These and many other factors have made
it very unusual for incumbents to lose congressio4
nal elections.
I.

JONATHAN MACEY: THE ECONOMICS OF CAPTURE
AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS

Professor Jonathan Macey has built a theory of judicial power
and interpretation based on his acceptance of the public choice
model of government action. In an impressive series of articles, he
has described the effects interest groups have on the political
system, explored inefficiencies created through interest group
politics, proposed judicial strategies for combatting the, excesses of
interest group politics, and provided a constitutional theory to
justify his proposed reforms. Macey's work is important because it
attacks prior public choice theory 'from within its own premises
and because it suggests reforms aimed at ameliorating the effects
of interest group politics. However, there are significant problems
with Macey's theory, most of which derive directly from his economics. All of this is amplified below.

A.

The Economics of Capture

The economic implications of public choice depend heavily
on how representative interest groups are, because the more
skewed the political marketplace is, the less likely that legislation
will reflect the preferences of the polity at large." In other
words, if the market for legislation functioned well, so that all
preferences were taken into account in roughly the same measure
as in the economic marketplace, then the results in the legislative
marketplace might mirror the results of the economic market-

32 M. FIORINA, supra note 1, at 100.
33 Id. at 53-66, 112-21.
34 Id. at 7-13.
35 For example, see Macey's discussion of constitutional formation in Macey, Competing Economic Views, supra note 6, in which he advocates a much more optimistic view in
part due to widespread participation. See also my discussion of this aspect of Macey's
theory infra Part II(B) and accompanying notes.
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place.36 However, if the situation is as bad as most public choice
theorists seem to believe, then the market is a failure that begs for
correction, lest it produce more massive inefficiencies through
redistributive programs under which the politically powerful seize
resources from the unorganized masses.37
Macey identifies two primary economic problems growing out
of interest group politics, the inefficiency of interest group transfers and the diversion of resources to lobbying activity. In what
follows, I present each of Macey's ideas and some comments on
them. As I noted at the outset, Macey's theory is attractive because
of its optimism that the legal system can do something to combat
the excesses of interest group politics. On the other hand, Macey's
analysis often turns out to be quite extreme, largely because
Macey does not make an effort to distinguish desirable from undesirable government action. This raises the suspicion that lurking
behind Macey's theory is a highly antiregulatory political agenda.
1. Interest Group Inefficiencies
Interest group transfers are inefficient, according to Macey,
because they are by nature coercive and thus unlikely to reflect
the preferences of the losers in the interest group game. Producers
of a product or service will go to government for a subsidy because they cannot obtain a higher price in the market. Consumers
would balk at paying the higher price in the market as they would
find substitutes or would consume less. Nevertheless, if producers
have something valuable to offer legislators, can overcome collective action problems and organize, and if consumers cannot overcome the impediments to organizing, then producers might be
able accomplish through law what they were unable to achieve in
the market.
Macey's argument here should seem familiar-it is a classic
law and economics objection to government intervention into the
marketplace. However, it is unclear whether Macey intends to
indict all government intervention or merely interest-group motivated activity. On the one hand, Macey's analysis can be read as

36

Mancur Olson argues that equilibrium among all interests in society is impossible.

See M. OLSON, RISE AND DECUNE, supra note 7, at 37.

37 Macey describes the process in Macey, Promoting Public Regarding, supra note 6, at
230-33. He uses the example of milk price supports-even though all milk drinkers are
hurt by price supports, milk producers are able to procure price supports because they
are a "small cohesive lobby." Id. at 232.
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an attempt to release government officials from interest group
pressures so they are free to devote themselves to working for the
public good. On the other hand, Macey's analysis appears dubious
as to whether government regulation is ever efficient. He expresses
the view that government regulation is inefficient so confidently
and so absolutely that his analysis could be read as extremely
antiregulatory. For example, he states that it is axiomatic that
market transactions are efficient, 8 and he proposes that administrative agencies, because they are easy targets for interest groups,
be abolished. 9
The assumptions implicit in Macey's analysis here prevent it
from being useful. Macey's baseline is a perfectly functioning market with no transactions costs or third party problems interfering
with the efficiency of the market. In such a world, government
action that interferes with the market is per se undesirable because it is always inefficient. In the real world, regulation is often
desirable on efficiency grounds. Without, regulation, transaction
costs prevent efficient market transactions and third party effects
render transactions, efficient between the parties, inefficient socially. Now I might be over reading Macey on this point because he
does envision a role for government freed from interest group
pressure, but it is unclear whether that role can be consistent with
his criticisms of the interest-group-dominated government.
Casual observation of the substance of legislation casts doubt
on the notion that redistribution always runs from the politically
powerless to the powerful. Antidiscrimination laws, public welfare
programs, and statutes lowering the tax burden on the poorest
members of society are hard to explain along the lines of shifts to
the powerful, although public choice theorists might attempt to do
so, perhaps by pointing out that the providers of the services are
attempting to entrench their bureaucratic positions or by identifying powerful interest groups that benefit from the programs. Of
course, there are plenty of counter-examples, but my point is not
that all legislation is benevolent,. -only that enough of it favors
relatively weak and unorganized interests to call into question
claims that legislative outcomes are dominated by wealth transfers
to the powerful.

38 See Macey, Transactions Costs and Normative Elements, supra note 6, at 513.
39 Id.

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:183

The possibility that some legislation redistributes wealth to
large groups of relatively poor individuals raises an interesting
aspect of the political system. Even though interest group support
helps, politicians still depend on large numbers of voters for their
political lives. Because votes are distributed one to a person while
wealth in the marketplace is distributed unequally, voters' interests
may sometimes prevail over special interests.4" No doubt wealth
plays an important role in the political realm, but in the end each
voter has equal power in an election, and candidates may sometimes find it advantageous to bypass interest groups in favor of a
populist appeal. In such a situation, the results of inequality in the
marketplace may be ameliorated in the political realm.
This equality of votes may make it difficult to make an efficiency claim about the results of the legislative process. To the
extent that outcomes in the market are influenced by wealth effects, the market may not be efficient, in that ability to pay may
not be an accurate measure of the intensity of preferences. 4 1 Legislation may sometimes counteract the inefficiencies produced by
inequalities in the marketplace. To a great extent, this effect depends on what ground rules one accepts for a market-that is,
whether unequal power in the market created by unequal wealth
should be treated as a defect or a given.
The problem of selecting ground rules for the market calls
into question the entire project of evaluating social programs
under an efficiency measure. Selecting such rules is a value-laden
enterprise, often involving competing conceptions of the good life
or the good society.42 Government rules and programs establish
the ground rules for the market, and the Constitution establishes
the ground rules for political competition. 4 The usefulness of

40 Ultimately, politicians, no matter how much money they have in their campaign
funds, must garner enough votes to win elections. "Government sometimes acts to benefit

large, diffuse, modestly interested groups that, according to special interest focused public
choice writings, would seem ill suited to command government's favor." Cass, Privatiation;

Politics, Law and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449, 475 (1988). Presumably, votes are what
drives this legislative behavior.
41 My colleague Joe Singer and I have argued that wealth may be like a transaction
cost in that it distorts outcomes as compared to a perfectly functioning market which
would move goods where they are most highly valued. With wealth inequality, goods may
disproportionately end up in the hands of the wealthy. See Beermann & Singer, Baseline
Questions in Legal Reasoning. The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911 (1989).

42
43

See generally id.
Macey, Competing Economic Views, supra note 6.
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efficiency as a normative criterion is limited when there is controversy over the ground rules for economic activity.
2.

Interest Group Opportunity Costs

The second problem Macey attributes to interest group politics is the diversion of resources from production to lobbying, a
societal case of opportunity costs, here the opportunity to employ
lobbying resources in more productive pursuits. This diversion will
occur as long as the expected gains from a dollar spent on lobbying are greater than the expected gains from a dollar spent on
production. The impediments to organizing that public choice
theorists claim make the system undemocratic ensure that for most
people the choice between production and lobbying will clearly be
for production. But for the few groups lucky enough to overcome
the impediments to organizing, the availability of wealth transfers
through government will discourage other, more productive, activity.
Macey argues that judges, through public interest oriented
statutory interpretation, can make interest group activity less attractive, and thus redirect resources toward activity more productive
than interest group politics. On this point, Macey's brand of public choice theory is constructive and interesting, and marks a substantial step forward from Chicago-school law and economics public choice analysis. Several commentators took the insights of public choice as support for extremely narrow statutory construction.' Under traditional interpretation, judges construed statutes
to advance an underlying public purpose.45 This traditional statutory interpretation was said to be inconsistent with the realities of
the legislative process because many pieces of legislation resulted
from interest group pressure and/or compromise, and thus had
no underlying public purpose.4 6 Moving a statute beyond its bare
terms toward advancing more effectively an underlying statutory

44 See Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983) (arguing, on
public choice grounds, that the domain of a statute be construed narrowly); see also,
Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword The Court and the Economic System, 98
HARV. L REV. 4 (1984); Landes & Posner, supra note 5; Posner, Economics, Politics and the
Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982).
45 The classic case for purpose-based statutory construction is Heydon's Case, 76
Eng. Rep. 634 (Ex. 1584). See also Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common Law Orbits, 17
CATH. U.L REV. 401 (1968).
46 See, eg., Posner, supra note 44, at 276 (discussing the lack of "sincere efforts" at
achieving public purpose in interest group legislation).
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purpose was thus portrayed as inconsistent with the legislature's
intent. 47
This preference for narrow statutory interpretation has several
possible bases. 48 First, a rather formalistic preference for whatever
the legislature intends, based perhaps on a principle of legislative
supremacy, might be at work. Second, the interest group market
for legislation might actually be viewed as desirable, since it tends
to deliver resources (here legislation) where they are most highly
valued. This would mirror a preference for private market results,
where transaction cost problems, similar to those identified by
public choice theory, are often ignored or downplayed by supporters of free market policies, and where the intensity of preferences,
as demonstrated by willingness (and ability) to pay, is thought to
maximize free choice. Third, a substantive preference for less
regulation might lead one to favor a narrow construction of legislation. The reasoning here could be that even if the legislature
were acting in the public interest, legislation is usually a failure,
and therefore, the narrower judges confine legislation the better.49
Macey agrees that judges should combat inefficiencies and
social waste, but apparently he thinks that the overall waste created by interest group activity is greater than that arising from judicial extension of misguided legislation. For Macey, construing
statutes to achieve their interest group related purposes would
only encourage interest groups to spend more resources on lobbying for government sponsored redistributive programs. Macey believes that the independent judiciary was created to serve as an
obstacle to rent-seeking behavior by interest groups.' Because he
views lobbying for such redistributions as a waste, Macey would
prefer that judges work to destabilize interest group deals.

47 Public choice teaches that had the legislature gone one step further, aggrieved
parties (e.g., other interest groups, unorganized voters) might have fought the legislation
and won. In an extreme case, a previously unorganized group might have found it worthwhile to organize to fight the extension. Id. at 266, 278-79.
48 Macey accuses Easterbrook of being "dismayingly vague" regarding the normative

bases for the notion that judges should merely enforce interest group bargains. See
Macey, Promoting Public Regarding, supra note 6, at 235-36 n.56.

49 Notice the similarity to two canons of statutory interpretation, statutes in derogation of common law should be strictly construed and exprensio unis exdcusio altemrs. The
empirical assumption leading public choice theorists to adopt expressio unis is that with
competing interest groups actively fighting unfavorable aspects of pending legislation, the
legislature is presumed to have rejected, at the insistence of potentially adversely affected
interest groups, anything not explicitly included in the statute.
50

Macey, Competing Economic Views, supra note 6.
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Destabilization would make legislation less valuable, so interest
groups would spend less money on lobbying.
Macey thus believes that judges, in order to destabilize interest group deals, should construe all legislation as if it were framed
in the public interest. In other words, judges should use traditional tools of statutory interpretation to advance the public interest
goals that the legislature, in order to fool the public, attaches to
all legislation, even the most blatant interest group transfer. Macey
is unconcerned with his proposal's fidelity to legislative intent or
notions of legislative supremacy generally. He reasons that the
Constitution grants judges the power to combat the tendency of
the other branches to fall prey to factions. Judicial independence
means that judges need not answer to factions. This, to Macey, is
the genius of the Constitution.5'
Macey's proposals potentially entail two desirable side-effects.
First, insofar as the public purposes the legislature attaches to
legislation constitute good policy, those purposes would be advanced by aggressive judicial construction. 2 Second, Macey's theory avoids difficulties inherent in attempting to distinguish publicregarding legislation from interest group transfers, as constructions
of some public choice theories seem to require. Under some theories, judges would be required to distinguish public interest from
interest group legislation, and construe the former broadly while
construing the latter narrowly.5" Such a distinction is very difficult
to make, and Macey's theory escapes this problem by treating all
legislation as if it were passed with the public interest in mind.
Macey recognizes that the legitimacy of judicial interpretation
of statutes as fulfilling a public interest is questionable since that
is not what Congress intended. His construction conflicts with "the

51 Macey has an elaborate explanation for why the framers of the Constitution were
able to overcome collective action problems and transcend private interest to create a
public regarding constitution. In a nutshell, he believed that there existed a competitive
market for constitutions and that the people would not have accepted a private-regarding
constitution. For a more detailed discussion of this aspect of Macey's theory, see infra
Part II(B) and accompanying notes.
52 I am unsure about Macey's attitude toward whether public choice theory allows
for legislation with a good public purpose. Theorists, like Easterbrook, seem pretty confident that most legislation, even legislation that looks like public interest legislation, is
bad. Judicial extension of such legislation would only compound the bad effects. If public
choice's empirical claims are accurate, and legislation tends to be produced to serve private rather than public purposes, then extending sham public purposes may only add to
the problem rather than ameliorate it.
53
See Posner, supra note 44, at 269, 272-82.
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basic constitutional premise, embodied in article I, that the legislature has the power to make law. " 4 Macey announces two principles for interpretive legitimacy which he recognizes appear to be
in irreconcilable conflict: "the interpretive act must (1) result in
making legislation more public-regarding by serving as a check on
legislative excess, and it must (2) not intrude on the constitutional
authority of the legislature to make law." 5 Macey believes that
the judicial role he envisions is legitimate because the Framers
assigned to judges the power to employ traditional statutory construction to combat the private-regarding nature of legislation.56
He derives this assignment largely from the fact that judges were
made independent of the other branches by life tenure and protection from diminished compensation, and from accepted features of traditional interpretation under which judges use the
legislatively-announced
public-regarding 'statutory purposes as in57
terpretive guides.
I agree with Macey that traditional statutory interpretation
tends to destabilize interest group bargains, largely because I believe that judicial interpretation often tends to undercut whatever
the legislature does. There is really no unified approach to interpretation such as Macey's "traditional statutory interpretation."
Instead there is sharp disagreement about the proper judicial attitude toward statutes, and there is relative indeterminacy in the
actual operation of statutory interpretation. Macey thinks that
the practice of writing reasoned opinions constrains judges to
interpret statutes with regard to the public interest.5 9 But judges
are certainly just as able as legislators to cover interest group
transfers with public interest language. Further, the existence of a

54

Macey, Promoting Public Regarding, supra note 6, at 225.

55

Id.

56

Id. at 225-26, 250-52.

57 Id. at 225-26. See also Macey, Competing Economic Vts, supra note 6, at 70 & n.59.
Macey acknowledges that if the private regarding nature of legislation is apparent from
its terms, courts have a duty to enforce it as written and thus further the legislation's
inefficient results. See Macey, Promoting Public Regarding, supra note 6, at 239.
58 See, for example, my exposition of the construction and application of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 in Beermann, A CriticalApproach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of
Law, 42 STAN. L REV. 51 (1988).
59 See Macey, Promoting Public Regarding, supra note 6, at 253-54 ('The chance that
special interest goals, disguised by the legislature, will survive interpretation by the third
branch is diminished further by the judiciary's traditional insistence in reason, analytical
coherence, and principled judgment in the judicial process. This historical commitment
to neutral principles is reinforced by the tradition that judges issue written opinions that
justify and explain their decisions.").
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tradition
of intent-based
interpretation'
alongside
the
counter-tradition of public-regarding policy-based interpretation,6 '
leaves judges with the tools to enforce, rather than frustrate, interest group deals.6 2
B.

The Economics of ConstitutionalPolitics

If the Constitution was designed to thwart, rather than further, interest group activity, and if public choice's description of
the political landscape is accurate, then the Constitution has been
a colossal failure. Despite the glaring failure of the Constitution to
contain interest group politics, Macey bucks the trend of economic
theories and argues that the proper economic understanding of
the Constitution is that it is a public-regarding document, designed to channel econaomic activity into private markets and away
from government. Macey explains that important constitutional
features are designed to frustrate the ability of interest groups to
achieve wealth transfers through government.
The Framers' possible failure to achieve their aims would not
usually be a significant criticism of a theory of what their aims
were, because what they were trying to do and whether they accomplished it are somewhat distinct questions. This is not to say
that the actual operation of the Constitution is not circumstantial
evidence of what the Framers intended-the law often presumes
that people intend the "natural and probable" consequences of
their actions. Because Macey all but ignores history, and because
he refutes competing theories by pointing out that they are inconsistent with the actual operation of the Constitution, the
Constitution's failure to contain interest group activity presents a
serious challenge to Macey's economic theory. Macey holds competing theories to a standard his own cannot meet.

60

For a

description

of the recent

resurgence

in

text-based

interpretation,

see

Eskridge, The New Textualim, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
61 For .a defense of policy-oriented interpretation, see Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L REV. 1479 (1979).
62 For an illustration of the disparate methods of construction available to judges,
and used to interpret a single statute, see Beermann, supra note 58.
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1. Macey's Economic Competitors'
Two theories, that of Charles Beard' and of the law and
economics movement,65 hold that the Constitution was designed
to protect powerful economic interests, either by shielding against
popular redistribution'
or by facilitating "countermajoritarian
wealth transfers desired by special interest groups."67 Macey does
not resort to history to try to disprove the competing theories.
Perhaps he believes that constitutional theory is inevitably normative because it is impossible to draw firm conclusions from the
Constitution's incomplete historical record, or perhaps he believes
that constitutional theory should be normative rather than descriptive. In any case, Macey's arguments against the competing theories make no historical claims-the Framers' expressed intentions
or the social context within which they acted are presumably irrelevant.
Macey's disagreements with Beard are surprisingly small, and I
suspect that Macey actually agrees with Beard's conclusion that the
Constitution was designed to "slow[] the pace of progressive
change and stifle[] the political expression of the popular will."'
Macey criticizes the competing theories on two levels: First, for
their views of the Constitution's operation', and next for their
views of the incentives facing the Framers when constructing the
Constitution.
On the Constitution's operation, Macey faults Beard for "erroneously [thinking] that agricultural interests were being stamped
out by the new Constitution,"69 and for believing that banking
70
and creditor interests would always prevail over debtor interests.
Macey recognizes that these criticisms do not touch Beard's basic
point, one shared with the law and economics movement, that the

63 Macey recounts these theories in detail and subjects them to criticism in Macey,
Competing Economic Views, supra note 6, at 50-71. 1 will go into as little detail as possible
here to avoid repeating what has already been written.
64 See C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913).
65 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 5.
66 See C. BEARD, supra note 64, at 63, cited in Macey, Competing Economic Views, supra

note 6, at 52 n.9.
67 Macey, Competing Economic Views, supra note 6, at 51.
68 Id. at 65 (discussing Beard's view of separation of powers).
69

Id. at 64.

70

Id. at 65.
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Constitution is a "set of rules that reflect interest group pres71
sures."
Macey's criticisms of earlier public choice theories involve the
importance of the separation of powers to the durability of interest group bargains struck through legislation. Earlier commentators argued that the separation of powers 2 increases the value of
special interest legislation by making it more durable. The gain
from certainty, it is argued, outweighs the increased cost of passing the legislation in the first place.73 Macey's response to this
line of argument is quite unconvincing. Macey points out that politicians need support over time (for example in the next election
which may be two, four, or six years away), and that if they consistently repealed interest group legislation shortly after it was passed,
interest groups would not provide the necessary support. Macey
strengthens this point by noting that durability may not be important in many situations where interest groups receive a one shot
subsidy.7 4 From this, Macey concludes that separation of powers is
not "essential" (as Landes and Posner claim) to the interest group
theory of government, and therefore, I gather, the interest group
theory of government does not explain separation of powers.
Macey's criticisms here are curious for several reasons. By
pointing out that the interest group theory works fine without
separation of powers, he appears at best to have won the battle by
conceding the war. He has refuted the idea that separation of
powers facilitates interest group activity by establishing that other
aspects of the legislative process, most significantly the persistent
and frequent need to stand for reelection, facilitate such activity
without help from separation of powers. He is therefore apparently admitting that the legislative structure established by the Constitution, by providing adequate mechanisms to safeguard against
easy repeal of interest group deals, facilitates, rather than retards,
interest group activity. He might argue in response that the Framers did not intend it that way, but for this argument to be convincing he would have to delve into the Framers' expressed intent
rather than intent revealed by the effects of the various Constitu-

71
72

Ia
The specific features Macey mentions here are the executive veto and the inde-

pendent judiciary. See id. at 66-68.
73 1& at 67 & n.80 and citations therein.
74 I argue below that this point undercuts Macey's claim that statutory construction

reforms are likely to affect significantly the amount of interest group activity. See infra
notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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tional features. In fact, he is unwise to rely on effects since, as
public choice theory reveals, interest group pressure is alive and
well under a Constitution Macey claims was designed to combat
such pressure.
His argument that separation of powers is not necess~ry to
prevent legislators from reneging on interest group bargains by
repealing legislation is similarly unconvincing. The fact that separation of powers might be cumulative of other mechanisms for enforcing interest group bargains does not prove anything about the
role separation of powers plays regarding interest group bargains.
In private contract, parties that deal together repeatedly often
enter into binding agreements to add security both against
short-term temptation to renege and against the dislocation that
might occur if one partner decides to end the relationship without
warning. Reputation plays an important role in parties' willingness
to continue dealing with one another, but that fact does not establish what role contracts play in the relationship.
2.

Macey's Positive Economic Theory

The other major point of disagreement Macey sees between
his analysis on the one hand and the analyses of Beard and other
public choice theorists on the other is on their predictions of the
outcome of constitutional politics. Macey argues that the competing theorists believe that because constitutional politics was affected by the same impediments to organization as other politics, the
powerful interest groups found it to their advantage to establish a
constitution that facilitated interest group transfers through government. The competing theories would thus explain each feature
of the constitutional structure by its contribution to interest group
bargaining.75 Macey, to the contrary, concludes that rational
groups would want a constitution that hampered group activity
because "most groups expect to be net losers from a pervasive
system of special interest group activit[y]."76 While Macey's point
here is interesting, for several reasons, his analysis is not very persuasive.

75 For example, Landes and Posner argue that the independent judiciary advances
interest group activity by enforcing the bargains made through the legislature. See Landes
& Posner, supra note 5; see also Crain & Tollison, The Executive Branch in the Interest-Group
Theory of Government; 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 555 (1979), as discussed in Macey, Competing Economic Views, supra note 6, at 67-68.
76 Macey, Competing Economic Vews, supra note 6, at 73.
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A major difficulty for Macey's theory is explaining the apparent contradiction between the private-regarding tendencies of
legislation and the public-regarding nature of the Constitution.
Macey has a fairly elaborate argument for why the Constitution is
public-regarding and therefore why other public choice theorists
who argued that the Constitution establishes, rather than combats,
interest group politics, were wrong. To Macey, the establishment
of a constitution is a special moment in the history of a polity,
not because people suddenly abandon private interest for public
concern but because the private incentives that guide everyday
action point toward establishing a public-regarding constitution.
One relatively minor error Macey commits is lumping Beard
together with the other theorists. Macey and Beard actually agree
that the Constitution was designed to make it difficult to pass
redistributive legislation. As Macey writes, the independent judiciary "was seen by Beard as the primary bulwark of the capitalists
against encroachment by subsequent legislatures bent on altering
the structure of society.... Other aspects of the system of checks
and balances, especially the bicameral legislature and the executive
veto, also enforce the status quo in Beard's view."77 They just disagree about the reasons the Framers made it so. While Macey
thinks it was because all of society realized it would be better off
if redistribution was difficult, Beard thought that the Framers were
protecting their own interests from popular redistributive efforts.
Since the Framers were from a relatively well-off segment of society, they might have been willing to give up potential gains from
interest group transfers in order to safeguard their dominant position in society. They had more to lose from redistribution than
others and acted out of an understandable risk aversion.
This error is compounded by Macey's ahistorical view of the
drafting and ratification of the Constitution. In order for a body
politic to adopt a public-regarding (rent-seeking inhibiting) consti-.
tution, Macey's theory requires that the likely "losers in future
rent-seeking activity be included in the process of constitutional
formation." 8 This is necessary because a public-regarding constitution will be adopted only when likely losers from such activity
participate in constitutional formation and pay the, likely winners
to forego the right to engage in rent-seeking. 79 The losers are

77
78
79

Id. at 60 (citing C. BEARD, supra note 64, at 161-64) (footnotes omitted).
Macey, 'CompeingEconomic Views, supra note 6, at 76.
See, e.g., id. at 74.
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able and willing to pay because, according to Macey, the transaction costs of constitutional bargaining are smaller than the transaction costs that are likely to be incurred in future rent-seeking.80
Macey abandons the critical eye of the public choice theorist
in his view of the framing of the Constitution. Under a public
choice analysis, because the stakes are higher, more people and
groups are likely to participate in constitutional politics than
would participate in ordinary politics. This unexceptionable point
tells us very little about how widespread such participation actually
is. According to Macey, the United States' Constitution was formed
with the requisite participation through the simple device of "requiring that the new Constitution 'be submitted to the people themselves.'"' (This is the only support Macey provides on this point.)
Macey thus sees the framing of the Constitution as an example of
ideal group politics, in which economic equilibrium was reached
through effective participation of all social groups merely because
the Constitution was formally submitted to the people
through the
8 2
device of constitutional ratification conventions.
The actual level of participation in the framing of the Constitution belies Macey's conclusion that the potential losers in interest group politics participated in its framing. It takes more than
the formal submission of the Constitution to the people, at ratification conventions, to establish that substantially all affected

80 This point is implicit in Macey's analysis. If it were the other way around, then
the parties would prefer rent-seeking to constitutional bargaining.
81 Macey, Competing Economic Views, supra note 6, at 79 (quoting THE FEDERALST No.
40 (J. Madison)) (emphasis in original).
82 Macey sets out three criteria for the formation of a public regarding
(anti-rent-seeking) constitution. They are: 1. "[Rlelevant interest groups be aware of the
costs and benefits of postconstitutional rent seeking so that they have an incentive to design a constitution that impedes such behavior." 2. "[I]nterest groups have the technical
ability to prepare a constitution that minimizes the costs associated with the prisoner's
dilemma that faces the citizenry of the postconstitutiona world." [The prisoner's dilemma
is that all interest groups will have an incentive to defect from the agreement that led to
an anti-rent-seeking constitution.] 3. "[Tlhose groups . . . who have a possibility of being
net losers in the wealth transfer game be included in the process of Constitutional formation." See Macey, Competing Economic riews, supra note 6, at 76. These requirements
make sense, because the knowledge, participation, and ability they entail appear to be
necessary for rational economic behavior. Although the discussion in the text focuses on
the weakness of the third criterion, Macey does not persuasively establish the first two
either. On the first, although it is true that the framers were worried about factions,
Macey has not shown that there was anything approaching the precision of understanding
that would allow participants to make the sorts of calculation he uses as an example. See
id. at 74. On the second, experience, as revealed by public choice theorists like Macey,
has shown that the framers did not know how to inhibit rent-seeking, or that if they did
know how they chose not to use such knowledge.
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groups' interests were taken into account in the Constitution.
Macey provides no specifics about the convention-ratification process that might persuasively establish that the conventions were
not dominated by the same types of groups that find it easiest to
organize in normal political life. Large segments of society were
not allowed to participate at all, such as women and slaves,"3 and
many important aspects of economic policy, especially before the
commerce clause expansions of the twentieth century, were left to
state governments that might also have restricted participation. It
is inconsistent with Macey's general approach to politics for him
to conclude so lightly that all interests were represented and taken
into account in the framing of the Constitution.
The importance of the possibility that large segments of society were not represented at the framing cannot be underestimated. If important segments of society did not participate, then we
have no way of knowing whether likely losers were able to pay the
winners to forego constitutional structures that facilitate
rent-seeking behavior. The groups that were present would have
no reason to act as surrogates for absent groups because no group
would have an incentive to pay more than it personally expected
to lose from rent-seeking behavior. Therefore, unless Macey can
establish that no significant interests likely to be adversely affected
by rent-seeking politics were left out of the constitutional framing,
he has not built a persuasive argument for his theory that the
Constitution was designed to inhibit rent-seeking behavior.
Macey's emphasis on the importance of competing constitutional visions to constitutional politics is worth revisiting because it
may be a light in the darkness of public choice. One of the reasons Macey is confident that the body politic was able to force the
Framers to offer a public-regarding constitution is that there were
competing constitutional structures available, and the Framers had
to convince the people that theirs was best for the overall public

83 Women and slaves had important interests at stake in the Constitution. The very
legitimacy of slavery was up for discussion, and if the slaves had been allowed to participate the results might have been different. As far as women were concerned, although
most laws disabling them economically were state laws, their interests were somewhat adverse to those of the men that were allowed to participate in the framing. Macey's willingness to ignore the fact that large segments of society were disenfranchised at the
framing of the Constitution, especially when his own theory requires that the likely "losers in future rent-seeking activities be included in the process of constitutional formation," casts serious doubt on the rigor of his economic analysis. See Macey, Competing
Economic Viws, supra note 6, at 79.
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good. This type of situation, however, may have existed other
times in the United States' history in addition to the framing of
the Constitution. For example, the Civil War and the Great Depression produced massive legislative (and in the case of the Civil
War, constitutional) changes in a political climate that may have
similarly involved large scale popular participation and social unrest in which leaders were forced to act in the public interest or
lose their positions of leadership. With cheap mass communication
and hotly contested political issues, "constitutional moments," in
which leaders must satisfy the popular will, may be less infrequent
than might be imagined.
III.

EFFICIENCY AND PUBLIC CHOICE

IMPLICATIONS OF MACEY'S THEORY

In this Section, I assume that Macey is correct, that the Constitution should be read to discourage rent-seeking activity. I look
at Macey's proposals for reform to realize the Framers' objectives
and subject them to two sets of related criticisms. First, I discuss
the conclusion that inefficient wealth transfers and spending on
lobbying are likely to decrease if Macey's proposals are adopted,
and that the resources saved are likely to be shifted to productive
activity. Second, I discuss potential effects of the proposals that
Macey apparently ignores. The basic thrust of these comments
involves analyzing the incentives on lawmakers and judges if a
substantial amount of interest group activity were eliminated. The
question is whether we should be confident that lawmakers and
judges are more likely to act in the public interest after they are
freed from the effects of interest group pressure.
A.

Reduction of Inefficient Transfers and
Lobbying Expenditures

Despite doubts raised above, let us assume that a substantial
proportion of legislation passed under current conditions results
in inefficient wealth transfers to the politically powerful. Let us
assume also that resources spent on lobbying are generally a social
loss, because if lobbying were not an available tool to capture
wealth, the resources could be spent on more productive pursuits.
The question addressed in this subsection is whether Macey's primary proposal, the destabilization of interest group deals through
statutory interpretation, is likely to move us in the right direction.
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In addition, I will consider the abolition of administrative agencies.
Two primary reasons exist to doubt Macey's conclusions. First,
Macey does not attempt to establish the magnitude of the shift
that his proposals would create. He provides nothing about how
much more expensive interest group activity would have to become (or how much less it would have to be worth) before resources would be shifted, and he does not address the actual effects his proposals would have. Second, Macey assumes, without
really attempting to prove, that the best
alternative to lobbying for
4
interest groups is productive activity.
Macey's interpretation proposal is unlikely to have a significant impact on the amount of interest group activity. When compared to other possible methods, such as campaign finance rules,
legal restrictions on the use of corporate money, and limits on the
duration of service for Members of Congress, this is a very indirect
way to combat interest group activity. Even if all federal judges
cooperated, there would be little or no effect in areas where statutory interpretation was not important, such as direct subsidies
through government spending programs or relatively clear provisions such as the specification of income tax brackets, import
tariffs or excise tax amounts.8 Further, to the extent that judicial
practice became uniform, Congress and interest groups could
adjust their legislative drafting practices to avoid pitfalls, just as
private parties adjust contract drafting to prevailing doctrine. Perhaps only if statutory construction was made random and unprincipled would significant insecurity arise. Finally, the fact that Macey
is proposing only that judges employ "traditional statutory interpretation" reveals the ultimate irony in Macey's theory-if judges have
been doing all along what Macey proposes, agreeing with Macey
should not change anything.
Even if Macey were proposing something new, the very real
possibility that groups could adjust to the new interpretive regime
raises the question of the location of the margin. There are two
ways in which public interest interpretation could tend to make

84 See Macey, Transaction Casts and Normative Elements, supra note 6.
85 Macey recognizes that groups are likely to prefer "self-enforcing" interest group
transfers to avoid "costly litigation." Macey, Competing Economic Vievs, supra note 6, at 69.
See also Macey, Glass-Steaga/l supra note 6, at 39 (if courts defer to administrative agencies, interest groups will attempt to avoid the necessity of persuading agencies by having
statutes written to bypass the agencies).
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interest group activity more expensive. First, it might cost more to
avoid or adjust to the new method of construction. 6 Second, to
the extent that uncertainty exists over whether avoidance efforts
have succeeded, the interest group deal is worth less to the parties
and thus a less worthy subject of investment of resources. But the
existence of these tendencies tells us nothing about their magnitudes and nothing about how much movement would be necessary
to accomplish anything worthwhile.
Resources will only shift away from lobbying if there exists a
more attractive use for those resources. It may be that interest
groups would respond to the increased costs of redistributive activity simply by spending more on that activity. This would occur if
the cost of gaining wealth through interest group activity remained
less than the cost of gaining wealth through production. The
contrary may also be true, but Macey makes no attempt to address
this problem. Thus, the possibility exists that an interpretive reform could result in increased interest group investment in the
same activity.
Another problem is that Macey has not established that production is the best alternative to interest group activity. It may be
that consumption, not production, lies at the margin. Wealth created through illegal activity, such as dumping of toxic waste, fraudulent financial practices, or pollution might also be a substitute
for interest group wealth. We just do not know where resources
diverted from interest group activity would be allocated.
Macey's more radical proposal, the elimination of administrative agencies, is fraught with even greater uncertainty, largely because he makes no realistic suggestion for replacement of the
publicly interested programs that agencies carry out.87 In general,

86 For example, more attention might have to be paid to drafting. Further, it might
be more difficult to achieve a nonconstruction sensitive subsidy, perhaps because the

potential political fallout is greater or perhaps because such a subsidy might be more difficult to construct.

87 The proposal to eliminate administrative agencies may reveal an antiregulatory
bias that casts doubt on the seriousness with which Macey puts forward the proposal that
judges construe statutes in line with the public interest. He makes this suggestion without
attempting to analyze the costs of deregulation. If collective action problems are so corrosive in the political realm, they might also prevent the market from realizing efficient
outcomes. Regulation might be necessary to correct market failures, and in some cases
administrative agencies might be the most desirable regulatory tool. Further, in so far as

Macey expects states to pick up some of the regulatory slack, he needs to analyze whether states are more or less efficient regulators than federal agencies. The lack of serious

analysis of these questions may mean that Macey lacks confidence in regulation generally,
a position that is somewhat inconsistent with favoring liberal judicial interpretation of
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this type of direct, structural reform should have a greater effect
than the indirect statutory interpretation device.8a Macey's only
suggestion to replace the work of the agencies is to leave issues to
the states.8 9 Elementary economics teaches that state regulation
over matters with interstate effects is not an adequate substitute
for .federal controlf Further, state governments might also fall
victim to interest group pressure, and if such activity is still the
best way to attain wealth, the costs may increase substantially if
lobbying has to be reproduced in many state legislatures or agen1
cies.f
The political pressure on federal legislators to find other
means to attack the problems abandoned by the elimination of
administrative agencies might redirect them to executive branch
administration. 2 (Eliminating executive branch administration of
government programs could not be accomplished without radical

regulatory statutes in line with the public interest purposes attached in the legislature.
88 More realistically, as far as having an effect is concerned, he proposes a strict ban
on delegation of legislative power to administrative agencies, on the ground that the
agencies are more open to interest group influence than Congress, and perhaps also because delegation allows Congress to avoid difficult choices and thus perpetuates interest
group politics when without delegation no legislation might have been passed. See Macey,
Transaction Costs and Normative El-ments, supra note 6, at 513. I find Macey's argument on
this point very difficult to pin down, because I cannot tell whether he is arguing against
delegation or against the very existence of the agencies. He also makes some confusing
comments about the tendency of agencies to be subject to influence by interest groups.
He states that interest group capture of agencies is "unusual" but he goes on to characterize the exercise of .administrative discretion as a lottery in which the highest interest
group bidder prevails. ILd.Further, he characterizes the "very existence of such agencies
[as] a glaring contradiction of the carefully constructed lawmaking procedures articulated
in article I." Id. at 514. Obviously, his analysis is not sufficient to settle one of the more
controversial issues in constitutional law, especially given Macey's glaring failure to distinguish independent from executive agencies.
89 See ia at 514 n.134.
90 See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS: CRISIS AND REFoRM (1984). States are indifferent between externalization of negative effects and elimination of the negative effects.
If externalization costs less than elimination, other states will suffer.
91 In fact, Macey has recognized that federal allocation of authority to the states is
driven by the same political forces that operate on the federal government generally. See
Macey, Federal Deference, supra note 6. Therefore, under Macey's theory, "for [some] issues,
Congress and administrative agencies will find that they can maximize political support by
refraining from regulating--even when they know that regulators at the state level will
step in and regulate in their stead." Id. at 267 (emphasis in original). He also argues
that one of the conditions under which states are likely to regulate is where "interest
groups have made an expropriable investment in a particular set of local regulations." Id.
at 274-75. Thus, Macey knows that allocating regulatory responsibility to state governments
does not contribute to solving the problems public choice reveals.
92 For example, victims of interstate pollution would still presumably elect Members
of Congress who favor federal regulation.
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constitutional change. Thus, I do not think Macey is proposing
anything of this sort.) Interest group activity would continue at the
congressional level. Even with substantially tightened antidelegation
norms, executive branch administrative procedures would probably
be similar to current agency procedure, especially those of current
executive branch agencies, thereby replicating the problems Macey
wants to eliminate.
Because it is painted with such a broad brush, it is difficult to
take seriously the suggestion that the agencies be eliminated. One
missing element is an attempt to construct a theory to distinguish
agencies that are more susceptible to interest group pressure. This
proposal also highlights the tension in Macey's attitude toward
regulation. Macey's statutory interpretation proposal, by providing
a constitutional justification for purpose-based construction of
regulatory statutes, seems nicely proregulation, especially when
compared to the attitudes revealed in the public choice inspired
works of Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook. But Macey
makes no effort to distinguish agencies that successfully administer
important federal programs from agencies that are tools of inefficient wealth redistribution. Even under the most purely economic
theory, at least some regulation is justifiable as preventing
externalities and countering the effects of transaction costs.
Therefore, even if it were desirable to raise the costs of interest group activity, it is unclear whether Macey's suggestions would
have that effect. Too many devices around the interpretive proposal exist, and the elimination of administrative agencies is too
far-fetched and unrealistic. Perhaps Macey hopes that as interest
groups become less important, the overall demand for regulation
will decrease, because the unorganized will have no voice to express their concerns. That would be a curious position for an
efficiency theorist to take, as it glorifies the blocking power of
transaction costs.
B.

Separation of Powers and the Incentives on
Lawmakers

It is very difficult to imagine politics in the United States
without a heavy dose of interest group influence. Let us assume,
however, that interest group activity became much more expensive,

93

It fits into William Eskridge and Gary Peller's characterization of the New Public

Law. See Eskridge & Peller, supra note 20.

19911

MACEY'S PUBLIC CHOICE

and that, therefore, it lessened substantially. This is not an automatic solution to the problem of private-regarding legislation,
because we still need to pay attention to the behavior of lawmakers and other government officials. We cannot suddenly abandon
the basic premise of public choice theory-that political actors are
motivated to act by their own interests. Macey assumes that the
result of removing opportunities to interest group pressure 'gould
be a shift from private-regarding to public interest legislation. 4
This assumption completely ignores questions about the incentives
operating on legislators. Therefore, we need to investigate what
interests would motivate lawmakers if they were largely freed from
interest group pressure.95
Obviously, reelection would remain a substantial motivating
factor for legislators. However, collective action problems would
still hinder the expression of the wishes of the average voter. Further, the increased costs of organizing that defeated the interest
groups might work in the same way against voters. At a minimum,
interested elected officials might have to spend more time and
money figuring out what voters want.
It is worthwhile to step back and think about legislative incentives in the context of separation of powers. My thesis here is that
government officials are, and were thought of by the Framers, as
one of the most powerful interest groups. Government officials, as
rational actors, tend to use the office of government for their own
gain, rather than for the maximization of the public interest.96
Two instruments counteract this tendency: pressure from people
and groups outside of government and competition among government organs as created by separation of powers.
Separation of powers counteracts the tendency of government
officials to use their power for their own purposes by forcing government officials to look both inward and outward for support. If

94 With less pressure, the overall volume of legislation might also diminish. This
would be a good thing to anyone who thinks that regulation is generally undesirable.
95 Professor Fred McChesney has argued that politicians may find the demise of
interest group politics undesirable because politicians, by threatening regulation, are able
to extract benefits from interest groups. See McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation
in the Ecnomic Theoty of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987). In a subsequent article,
McChesney argues that groups might be better off not organizing, because legislators
might find it easier to extract rents from an organized group since transactions costs are
lower than with a large number of unorganized individuals. See McChesney, Rent Extraction
and Interest-Group Organization in a Cosean Model of Regulation, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 73
(1991). Perhaps if interest groups did not exist, legislators would create them.
96 See Cass, supra note 40, at 477.
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all power inhered in one person or in one relatively small branch
of government, checking that power would be difficult. In a system of separated powers, outside influence tends to increase because there are more avenues for influence on government. Further, by dividing power and giving each branch (or division within
a branch) the means to fight the other branch for power, internal
forces are deployed against concentrations of power. Separation
of powers, understood this way, means assignments of power with
uncertain boundaries-the uncertainty of the boundaries and the
overlap between the branches create conditions of conflict over
98
authority and, thus, over political power.
The constraints on power depend, to some extent, on the
existence of outside forces to check (along with internal forces)
concentrations of power. While frequent election for the House of
Representatives is an important check, interest group pressure acts
similarly as a check on the ability of politicians to abuse their
power. Without the necessity to please interest groups, and with a
voting public generally unable to organize, public choice theorists
should expect government officials to be freer to use government
for their own purposes. While elected and appointed officials are
certainly subject to substantial political pressure, as they grow
more insulated from external pressure from interest groups, they
might become more like federal judges:
[I] t is difficult to predict the nature of the incentives to which
judges are likely to respond. In light of the fact that Article III
judges cannot affect their wealth by deciding cases in particular
ways or by favoring certain groups, it seems plausible that some
judges will decide cases so as to maximize their prestige with
certain constituents, such as liberals, conservatives, or academics. Other judges will care little for prestige and simply maximize their leisure time. Still other judges will decide cases so as
to impose their own values-their own personal vision of the
good-upon society. Judges simply have no incentive to substitute the enforcement of a set of bargains between interest
groups and legislators for their
own set of preferences regard9
ing the outcome of a case.

97 See THE FDERAusT Nos. 37, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52
98

(J. Madison).

See Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State

89 COLUM. L REV. 453, 495-99 (1989); Beermann, Bad Judicial Activism and Liberal Federal
Courts Doctrine: A Comment on Professor Redish and Professor Doernber, 40 CASE W. RES. L
REV. 1053, 1061-66 (1990).
99 Macey, Competing Economic Views, supra note 6, at 70.
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Fighting among the branches might still suppress this tendency to
some extent, but one important check on government abuse
would be removed. Thus, removing the interest group check on
government action is only in the public interest if the remaining
influences on government action are more closely aligned with the
public interest than interest group desires.
Perhaps the idea is that with interest group pressure removed,
legislators would be more responsive to the wishes of their constituents."°° This might be good in terms of democracy, but it
would not solve the tendency of legislation to reflect narrow, private interests. Each member of the House of Representatives represents about 1/435 of the population, and the member's ability
to get reelected will turn on the ability to please that small group.
That group's incentive is to maximize gain to itself and externalize
the cost on everyone else. Senators and the President have less
ability to do this because they represent larger percentages of the
population and thus their own supporters are more likely to feel
the negative effects of legislation along with the benefits to themselves.'
Legislators' ability to bring federal money home
(pork-barrel legislation) and help constituents deal with government may be very important to reelection prospects. 10 2 These activities will not necessarily coincide with the public interest.
One theory is that freed from interest group constraint, legislators will pursue their own ideological agendas. 03 Macey argues
that politicians that act in this fashion will not survive, although
he acknowledges that studies dispute this point. 0 4 The studies
purport to show that the best predictor of the votes of Members
of Congress is their ideologies. These studies control for the eco-

100 This argument assumes that the impediments to interest group organizing would
not also increase the costs of participation to individuals. The removal of interest group
pressure would probably have one positive effect; the cost of participation would decline
somewhat because the probability of success for individuals would increase due to the
lack of competition from interest groups. However, the magnitude of this effect is quite
uncertain.
101 See M. OLSON, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 7, at 47-53 (discusses encompassing
groups).
102 See M. FRORINA, supra note 1. Fiorina chronicles the changes in the operation of
Congress that have facilitated a significant growth in constituent services. Incumbent
Members of Congress are thus able to use taxpayer money to further their reelection
prospects, a blatant use of government pover for their own, rather than the public's
benefit.
103 See Kalt & Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for PrindpalAgent Sack in Political Institutions, 33 J. L. & ECON. 103 (1990).
104 See Macey, Competing Economic Vieivs, supra note 6, at 63 n.56.
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nomic interests of constituents and other factors that might call
their conclusions into doubt."' These studies and other factors
led Fiorina to conclude that constituent services are incredibly
important,
perhaps more important than any vote a legislator
6
makes.1

The elimination of administrative agencies is also unlikely to
lessen the divergence between the public interest and the interests
of legislators and their constituents. Unless it meant that government was less likely to regulate at all, concentrating all administrative power within hierarchies headed by the President could shift
the balance of power to the executive branch, and loosen political
constraints on the President and other executive officials. This
could result in abuse of power within the executive branch in
favor of the private interests of executive officials. The question
here would be whether executive officials would be more or less
constrained than independent agencies. Within government, I
suspect that in some cases, independent agencies are subject to
more congressional control, because independent agencies have
no independent political legitimacy and depend on Congress for
budgeting and jurisdiction.'07 The President might be subject to
greater outside constraint because the President needs support
from more people than any other elected official and is therefore
less able to externalize costs of unwise government action.
The major intragovernmental restraint on abuse of power is,
according to Macey, the independent judiciary.'
His theory
stands in sharp contrast to that of Landes and Posner, who posit
that, since an independent judiciary is not subject to pressure to
revise the terms of previously reached accommodations, it is an
ideal enforcement mechanism for interest group deals."° Macey
105 See Kalt & Zupan, supra note 103, at 116-24.
106 See M. FIORINA, supra note 1, at 39-47.
107 The dynamic of congressional control over agency action is extremely complicated. Congress' control is obviously not complete, but it might be greater than any control
Congress might have over executive branch action, because the President's political power
is then involved. If presidential input is freer from Congress' influence, then the
President's (or another executive official's) private interest might dominate.
Because a detailed examination of the degree of influence Congress has over various agencies and executive branch departments is beyond the scope of this Article, I am
completely ignoring differences in congressional influence (and interest group influence)
among executive branch departments and independent agencies. These differences may
be significant. See Cass, Allocation of Authority Within Bureaucracies. Empirical Evidence and
Normative Analysis, 68 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1986).
108 See Macey, Promoting Public Regarding, supra note 6; see also Macey, Competing Economic Views, supra note 6.
109 See Landes & Posner, supra note 5, as discussed in Macey, Competing Economic Views,
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argues that politicians' need for continued support for reelection
purposes and for maintaining a reputation for reliability means
that an independent judiciary is not necessary to ensure the durability of interest group deals."' As noted, this argument is unpersuasive as a proof that judges do not further interest group
politics, because the fact that judicial enforcement might be cumulative of other enforcement methods does not mean that judges
do not behave in the way Landes and Posner assert. Macey further
argues, much more persuasively in my opinion, that Landes and
Posner do not "explain why.., judges have any rational incentive
to act as the enforcers of the contract between special interest
groups and legislators.""' It is inconsistent with -public choice
theory to assert that officials are likely to behave in certain ways
without identifying incentives for them to do so.
That very failure is what leaves so many questions in Macey's
approach to combating interest group influence in the political
system. I have already discussed the lack of attention to the incentives on legislators freed from interest group politics. Even more
glaring is the failure to address seriously the incentives facing
judges." 2 Something must motivate judges to decide cases one
way rather than another. One reason little is written about judicial
behavior from a public choice perspective is that it is very difficult
to get a handle on the influences operating on judges."' While
4
acknowledging uncertainty over the influences judges feel,"
Macey mentions a few factors that might motivate judges: the
desire for prestige, the desire to increase their influence, the desire to be promoted to a higher court, the desire to maximize

supra note 6, at 66-71.
110 Macey, Competing Economic Views, supra note 6, at 68-69.
111 Id. at 69.
112 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
113 For an excellent treatment of judicial behavior from a phenomonological point of
view, see Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication. A Citical Phenomenolgy, 36 J.
LEGAL EDUc. 518 (1988). The article is a first person account of the mental processes of
judging a case in which the judge's initial assessment of the case is that the law is contrary to how the judge would like the case to come out. In the course of his discussion,
Kennedy suggests several influences on the judge's behavior, including the desire to further one's general political outlook, worry about how others will view the decision, how
the decision fits in with the judge's self-image, the judge's desire to maximize legal reform possibilities, the judge's sense of justice, the judge's sense of obligation to the public, the possibility of sanctions from the community, and the desire to minimize the work
required to do the job. See id. at 520, 521, 526-27.
114 He has made this point several times. E.g., Macey, Promoting Public Regarding, supra
note 6, at 260-61; Macey, Competing Economic Views, supra note 6, at 70.
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leisure time, and the desire to impose their own values on
society." 5 (Presumably Macey believes that these influences will
lead judges to make decisions that coincide with the public interest. Landes and Posner, on the other hand, believe that judges
will attempt to uphold legislatively intended interest group deals
because of judicial custom and professionalism.11 6) Macey states
further that judges are worried about chastisement from colleagues
and academics." 7 Macey believes that congressional control over
wages (in the form of pay increases) and working conditions (in
the form of appropriations) does not significantly affect judicial
behavior because appropriations and raises are done en masse rather than one judge at a time.' In such a situation, judges each
have, an incentive to maximize their personal utility, because they
will bear only a small percentage of the cost of any punishment at
the hands of Congress." 9
Public opinion and the ideology of the judge may be important explanatory factors. For example, one study indicated that on
civil liberties cases, the preconfirmation views of a nominee to the
United States Supreme Court were highly correlated to the votes
the nominee cast after confirmation. 2° Another showed that sentences for marijuana related crimes correlated with public opinion.' 2' Extensive literature also exists on the relationship between
115 Macey, Competing Economic Virews, supra note 6, at 70; Macey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Deasis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63, 94 (1989).

116 See Landes & Posner, supra note 5.
117 Macey, Competing Economic riws, supra note 6. The incompleteness of Macey's
views on judicial behavior is further illustrated by the comment that judges will not defer
to the intent behind old enactments because there is "nothing to gain by preserving"
what a bygone Congress wanted. Macey, Transactions Costs and Normative Elements, supra
note 6, at 497. There are many examples in which courts at least purport to be following the intent of a past Congress, sometimes a distantly past Congress. See Beermann,
supra note 58, at 66-73 (describing cases in which the intent of the 1871 Congress is
identified by the Supreme Court as the touchstone of the construction of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1988)). Legislative intent is a powerful legitimating factor in our legal system, and
it is used as such, even when the court has no idea what the legislative intent really is.
118 See Macey, Transactions Costs and Normative Elements, supra note 6, at 498.
119 At the Supreme Court level, the effect of punishment to each Justice is much
higher because there are so few Justices. Thus, Congress might potentially have greater
influence at the highest level.
120 See Segal & Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83
AM. POL Sci. REv. 557 (1989). The study covered all members of the Court from Earl
Warren through Anthony Kennedy, and relied on preconfirmaion newspaper accounts of
the Justice's views. Another study showed that the sentences U.S. district judges gave to
Vietnam-era draft resistors varied directly with the casualty rate in Vietnam. See Kritzer,
Political Correlator of the Behavior of FederalDistrictJudges: A Best Case Analysis, 40 J. POL 25
(1978).
121 See Kuklinski & Stanga, Political Participation and Government Responsiveness: The
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social background and judicial decisions.'22 Finally, there is even
evidence, that the behavior of interest groups might have some
influence on the United States Supreme Court. 2 '
It is not difficult to see how public opinion, or at least the
opinion of the bar and legal academics, could have a powerful
effect on judicial behavior. Only the rare person has the fortitude
and strength of conviction to be the maverick or renegade. Judges
must derive satisfaction from the respect they earn through decisions that are accepted by their colleagues and critics. Bar associations honor judges, invite them to meetings in warm climates to
make speeches, and generally enhance their prestige through
approval. Academics increase the stock of judges by praising their
decisions in the law journals and by also inviting the judges to
make speeches and be honored at law school functions. A social
system is at work here, and most judges would suffer if they were
left out.
Ironically, the great believers in incentives spend little energy
figuring out whether the targets of their criticism have any incentive to listen to what they have to say. Many public choice theorists make proposals aimed at judges without considering whether
judges have any incentive to act in accordance with their suggestions. Perhaps there is an implicit belief that judges have a great
incentive to gain approval in the legal community by following
academic theories.
Applying the public choice model to judicial decision making
appears to be very difficult. As Macey acknowledges, it seems that
the less judges are constrained by outside forces, the more likely
they are to use their positions for their own ends. 12 4 Just what
those ends are may vary from judge to judge, but Macey cannot
persuasively rely on judicial construction and other judicial reon judges are
forms without demonstrating that the incentives
125
likely to coincide with the public interest.

Behavior of Caifornia Superior Courts, 73 AM. POL SCl. REV. 1090 (1979).
122 See Grossman, Social Backgrounds andJudicialDecisions: Notes For a Theory, 29 J. POL
,534 (1967).
123 One study indicates that the Court is more likely to grant certiorari when interest

groups participate as amicus curiae. See Caldeira & Wright, Organited Interests and Agenda
Selling in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. PoL Sc. REV. 1109 (1988).
124 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. If we assume that judges have some
obligation to "the law" or to Congress, then judges who decide based on their own views
would be shirking. See Kalt & Zupan, supra note 103 at 105.
125 See Caldeira, The Incentives of Trial Judges and the Administration of Justice, 3 JUST.
Sys. J. 163 (1977). Caldeira describes different types of judges and the ways they derive
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C. Macey's (Lack of a) Political Vision
As I noted at the outset, there is much in Macey's vision of
good government that I find instinctively appealing. The interest
group inhibiting role Macey envisions for judges and other features of the political structure are quite attractive because they appeal to the desire to raise politics to a higher level than naked
economic preference and "channel those interests towards the
public good."'2 6 But while Macey does an excellent job of illustrating the features of government that perform the negative function of restraining interest groups, he presents no positive image
of government. That is, he does not contrast his negative analysis
with discussion of the appropriate influences on government or
the appropriate circumstances for government action.
Macey's decidedly negative view of human nature may account, at least in part, for his failure to discuss the positive aspects
of government. Macey goes beyond the economist's assumption of
self-interest as the motivating factor for government action and
1 27
claims that the assumption is accurate as an empirical matter.
Macey may be so pessimistic
about the prospects for
postconstitutional public-regarding political action that he cannot
even talk about it. Thus, because the republican tradition does not
share his distrust of the state, he implies that a society living under a theory of civic virtue would be unable to resist a
28
government's desire to carry out genocide against a minority.
No wonder Macey allows for no positive government role-he is
too afraid of it.

satisfaction.
126 See Macey, The Missing Element, supra note 6, at 1683. Macey has this interest in
common with theorists trying to revive the notion of civic virtue as the organizing prin-

ciple of legal and political theory. Id.
127 See id. at 1673. Macey argues that the Framers of the Constitution shared his view
of human nature. I& Unquestionably, Macey's argument here is correct insofar as it is
true that the Framers described one of their goals as restraining the tendency of people

to look after their own interests in politics. See THE FEDERALIsT No. 10 (J. Madison). On
the other hand, the Framers repeatedly referred to the need to balance this against gov-

ernment effectiveness. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (J. Madison) ("Among the difficulties encountered by the convention, a very important one must have lain in combining
the requisite stability and energy in government with the inviolable attention due to
liberty and to the republican form.") Macey seems to have lost the second part of this
balance.
128 See Macey, The Missing Element, supra note 6, at 1675 (quoting favorably an explanation of Italian aid to Italian Jews that relies on a distrust of government and lack of
civic virtue in Lytterton, La Forza del Destino, N.Y. REV. BOOxS, Mar. 31, 1988, at 3.8).
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It is thus ironic that Macey considers himself a "pluralist.""
I had always thought a "pluralist" to be someone who believes that
the path to democracy in a large, complex society is through
groups.8 0 Macey is in reality an antipluralist,, hoping to defeat
the ability of interest groups to affect politics at every turn. But he
leaves nothing in place of group influence. Because most people
face great impediments to political participation and incumbents
can garner advantages for themselves through government, rather
than the interests of groups, government officials might be free,
under Macey's ideas, to relentlessly pursue their own interests.
This would be to our collective detriment.
D.

Structural Reform Alternatives

In light of my doubts that the interpretation-focused reforms
Macey proposes are likely to have much of an effect, and the
dangers I find inherent in lessening the ability of interest groups
to exercise pressure on legislators, the next question is whether
anything can or should be done to combat the tendency for legislation to be directed to benefiting narrow interests. I want to
focus in this subsection on two sets of possible reforms: those
aimed at enhancing the openness of the interest group process
and those aimed at lessening the ability of interest groups to have
influence.
In general, reforms that increase the ability of all groups to
participate in the political process are preferable to ones that impede interest activity for two reasons. First, as discussed above,
leaving legislators with no interest groups to answer to raises questions concerning what constraints are left on purely self-regarding
behavior by legislators. Second, in line with pluralist thought,
more political activity is preferable to less. Therefore, reforms
designed to increase the ability of people to participate in politics
are preferable as well.
The discussion that follows should be approached with one
reservation. I have made no effort to identify the actual groups
whose activities might be stimulated by the specific reforms discussed. Therefore, any conclusions regarding the nature or degree
of the changes that might come about if the specific reforms were
adopted would be somewhat speculative. It should be understood

129
130

See Macey, The Missing Elemen, supra note 6, at 1682.
See supra notes 9-22 and accompanying text.
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that my purpose here is limited to suggesting possibilities rather
than advocating particular changes.
As discussed above, one of the biggest problems with the
political process is that some interest groups may have disproportionate influence simply because they are able to overcome collective action problems. If the ability to overcome collective action
problems is unrelated to the general social support for these interest groups' agendas, the political process will appear defective.
One way to combat this might be to facilitate the organization of
interests that might not be able to organize otherwise. These
groups could then counteract the strength of preexisting groups.
Government subsidies or tax deductions for interest groups
might help more interests become viable players in politics.'
Government could use its control over the radio and television
airwaves to allow groups without substantial finances time to express their opinions and solicit members, and require that small
party candidates be allowed to participate in broadcast presidential
debates. 3 2 Government funding could establish advisory boards
or institutes composed of many different viewpoints and could
establish a process under which the views of these groups could be
brought before Congress and the public.
Making voting easier would also be a positive step. Voter registration at the polls, and holding elections over the weekend
rather than on a workday might increase participation. Public
financing of the campaigns of candidates or parties with relatively
low levels of support might also increase the interest of people
who are not satisfied with the positions of the two major political
parties.
Macey would probably argue that opening the political system
to more interest group activity would only compound the twin
problems of wasteful lobbying expenditures and diversion of resources away from more productive alternatives. Here it is important to consider whether money spent on politics is truly wasteful.

131 Businesses can already deduct expenses related to lobbying for legislation and
contributions to interest groups as business expenses, so long as the interest group does
not use the money for a political campaign or for convincing the public of a position.
See 16 U.S.C. § 162(e). (1988). Individuals, on the other hand, are not allowed to deduct
contributions to groups engaged in lobbying, because charitable organizations lose their
tax-exempt status if they engage in political activity. See I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 501(c)(3)
(1991).
132 For a discussion of legal and policy aspects of what the author terms "speech
equalization," see Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking. ConstitutionalInterpretalion and Nega-

tive First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1484-90 (1987).
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True, at the end of a day of lobbying or other group activity no
interest group has produced a product to sell on the market.
However, the expressive and associational activities may be valuable
in and of themselves to people, and efforts to curb such activities
might be seen as repressive in a free society. I prefer to encourage
more activity, just as many believe that the best antidote to bad
speech is more speech and not censorship.
The second type of reform, efforts to close the political system to improper influences, should also be pursued, but only if
they do not threaten the general vitality of the political process.
The legislative process could be reformed to make it less amenable to narrow interest group pressure. For example, analysts have
long pointed to the committee system as in need of reform.'33
Rotating committee membership, and multiple committee jurisdiction over the same subject matter might mitigate the ability of
committee members to disproportionately influence matters within
committee jurisdiction. 3 4
Strict regulation of business relationships between Members of
Congress and regulated parties, 1 5 requirements that policy discussions be placed on the public record' and limits on direct
campaign financing by interest groups might enhance the openness of the political process. Recently, limitations on the terms of
Congress have been discussed-such limitations would reduce the
value of incumbency and lessen the incentive for incumbents to
amass large campaign funds, thereby making money less influential
in the election process.'3 7 In addition, the entire system of cam-

133 See Shepsle & Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM.
POL Sd. REv. 85 (1987). But see Krehbiel, supra note 22, at 149 (suggesting that research
does not support the hypothesis that committee members are unrepresentative of views
held in the legislative body at large).
134 See M. FIORINA, supra note 1, at 121-24 (overlapping committee jurisdiction forces
more matters to the floors of Congress where they receive a more open hearing).
135 For example, limitations on outside income help prevent schemes to get around
restrictions on campaign finance and bribery. See McBride, Ethics in Congress: Agenda and
Action, 58 GEo. WASH. L Rzv. 451 (1990) (discussing limits on honoraria, gifts, and outside income for Members of Congress).
136 This would be a fairly significant change from current practice, which does not
restrict the ability of Members of Congress to hold confidential discussions on matters of
policy with potential regulated parties. In administrative law, some off the record discussions between regulators and interested parties must be placed on the administrative
record. See Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977); Administrative Procedure Act § 557(d), 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1988).
137 See Payne, Limiting Government by Limiting Congressional Terms, PuBuc INTEREST,
Spring 1991, at 106; see also Mitchell, Limiting Congressional Terms: A Return to Fundamental
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paign finance seems ripe for review. Legitimate questions exist
concerning the desirability of millions of dollars of public action
committee money playing an important role in elections.
In line with Macey's view of the importance of the independent judiciary to restraining legislative excesses, some judicially
enforceable limitations on the substance of legislation might be in
order. For example, many state constitutions contain bans on
special legislation. 38 These clauses potentially prohibit legislation
narrowly framed to benefit special interests. Buchanan and Tullock
suggest a requirement that the costs of legislation benefitting a
narrow class be borne by the benefitted class." 9 While reforms
along these lines might require constitutional amendment, or at
least substantial reinterpretation of
existing constitutional provi4
sions, they are worth considering. 0
IV.

CONCLUSION

Public choice theory has much to offer as a way to understand the political system. Potentially, it could help to design legal
reforms that would maximize democracy and minimize the opportunity for government officials to use government for their own
private purposes. -Public choice would accomplish something important if it could help the legal system redirect the political system toward acting more in the public interest.
Jonathan Macey's focus on the public interest is refreshing
and provides a counterpoint to earlier public choice influenced

Denocracy, 7 J. L. & POL 733 (1991).
138 See, e.g., ILL CONsT. art. IV, § 13. Special legislation clauses are the flip side of
equal protection clauses-rather than prohibiting arbitrary discrimination, they prohibit
arbitrary granting of benefits. See Illinois Polygraph Soc'y v. Pellicano, 83 111. 2d 130,
137-38, 414 N.E.2d 458, 462 (1980) ("Special legislation confers a special benefit or exclusive privilege on a person or a group of persons to the exclusion of others similarly
situated. It arbitrarily, and without a sound, reasonable basis, discriminates in favor of a
select group.") (citations omitted).
139 See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOcK, supra note 13, at 293. They acknowledge that
this would not work with much social welfare legislation where the point is to redistrib-

ute wealth to relatively poor individuals or communities, but this idea has worked, for
example, at the municipal level, where neighboring landowners often pay extra taxes for
street and sidewalk improvements.

140

Buchanan and Tullock thought, in 1962, that interest groups might consent to

constitutional changes designed to make their activity more difficult because the costs of
bad legislation were being felt so widely that everyone might realize that they would be
better off without interest group legislation. See id. at 290. This is similar to the understanding that Macey argues motivated the framers to adopt such provisions at the time of
the framing. There is no indication that this has come to pass.
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legal theories that would have made judges into agents of interest
group politics. Macey's theory, however, does not succeed, because
his suggestions for statutory interpretation lack bite and because
he does not apply the assumption of self-interest to the behavior
of unconstrained legislators and judges.
In light of all the uncertainty concerning the magnitudes of
the effects involved, and the lack of a discussion of when government action is desirable, Macey's willingness to suggest that administrative agencies be abolished points up a disturbing aspect of
public choice theory. Seemingly, public choice theorists are so
convinced of interest group domination that nothing government
does could possibly be in the public interest. 141 There is very littie in Macey's work that shows any confidence in Congress' ability
to do anything right. A persuasive theory of political behavior will
have to explain the good as well as the bad.
Economic analysis such as Macey's is very good at revealing
logical tendencies under the assumption of self-interest. In other
words, his analysis helps predict in which direction a reform might
lead us. On the other hand, it tells us very little about the magnitude of those effects, and it tells us nothing about the desirability
of those effects from perspectives other than the purely economic.
The only way to learn about these issues is through empirical and
philosophical investigations.
Burning political and philosophical issues remain at large
concerning the proper judicial role and the degree to which legislators should be free from interest group pressure under our constitutional structure. The economist's fantasy is to resolve these
questions through calculations and formulae. It is a different project to choose from among plausible theories, a project that must
transcend cold economic calculations.
The seeds of a richer theory lie in Macey's description of the
conditions that led to the framing of a public-regarding constitution. As the United States becomes a more inclusive society, and
as it faces more and more serious social and economic problems,
the incentives to abandon interest group absolutism in favor of
publicly oriented compromise may recreate moments like the
framing of the Constitution. This, coupled with the growth of interest groups representing greater numbers of previously voiceless

141 See Kelman, On Democraq-Bashing.A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empiical
Practice of the Public Choice Movement; 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988).
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interests, might democratize the process much more than statutory
construction ever could.

